6.1 Managing
unpredictability
Unpredictability
is inherent to spate irrigation, yet water distribution rules
regulate the distribution of the unpredictable water supplies.
They impose a pattern and reduce uncertainty and potential
conflict by regulating the relations between the landowners
that have access to flood water. Particularly where flood
water users depend on one another in maintaining flood channels
and reconstructing diversion structures, agreement on how
water is distributed is a precondition for cooperation between
different parties in this respect.
In
the medium and long term unpredictability also characterizes
spate irrigation systems. Changes due to the increase in land
levels and changes in river courses and flood channels are
almost inevitable. This makes spate irrigation system far
more dynamic than perennial irrigation systems (Hadera 2001).
The way rights are defined in spate systems is also different.
Water rights in spate systems are essentially reactive - dealing
with accepted claims and distribution rules in a changing
environment rather than measurable rights to a natural resource,
as in perennial systems (van Steenbergen 1997b).
The
chapter describes the different types of water distribution
rules (6.2) and how they are enforced (6.3). The final section
(6.4) describes how changes in the water distribution rules
take place, as a result of external interventions.
6.2
Water distribution rules
There
are several types of rules in spate irrigation and it is usual
to find that two or three are applied simultaneously in any
system. The repertoire of water distribution rules is:
·
the
demarcation of land that is entitled to irrigation;
·
rules
on breaking of diversion bunds:
·
proportion
of the flow going to different flood channels and fields;
·
the
sequence in which the different fields along a flood channel
are watered;
·
the
depth of irrigation that each field is to receive;
·
the
practice regarding second water turns.
Rules
on land demarcation
Demarcation
rules define the boundary of the area entitled to irrigation.
As such, it precedes all other water distribution rules. Instead
of merely regulating seasonal water supplies, the demarcation
of the land entitled to irrigation also predicts what will
happen when changes in the entire system occur. In dynamic
spate systems such changes are frequent, as rivers change
their course and flood channels breach, scour out or silt
up. Demarcation rules are conservative, because, in the wake
of these changes they try to re-establish the prior situation.
They in fact often protect the prior rights of downstream
landowners, because they prohibit new land development upstream,
which could in the end result in the diversion of flood water
to new territories and a redefinition of the group of shareholders.
The demarcation of the outer boundaries also ensures that
overspill from breaches in flood channels does not develop
into an established practice (van Steenbergen 1997). In the
spate systems of the Suleiman range in Pakistan very explicit agreements existed, obliging landowners
to plug gullies that developed after severe floods. This would
prevent a new drainage patterns to develop in these alluvial
plains. Such rules are not in force everywhere though.
What happens at times is that overspill areas
- though they do not have a recognized entitlement to the
spate flows - get a secondary right to the flood water, de
jure or de facto. They are only irrigated during high floods,
when the flow in the flood channels is so high that it is
allowed to escape at certain pre-arranged points to avoid
damage to the channel network downstream.
Like
most distribution rules demarcation rules are in place when
water is scarce. They are more common in long-established
lowlands systems, where floods are more of a given quantity
than in new systems or highland systems. Ahmad et al (1998)
for instance document the ongoing land formation in four small
upland systems in Balochistan (Pakistan). Using the silt deposited by the spate water
in the fields as well as from borrow pits in the flood channels,
command areas increased as population pressure did in the
lat 50 years. The area under spate irrigation increased from
148 ha to 205 ha. The increase in population and tractors
enabled a better control of the water. In highland systems
where the flood water when it comes is usually abundant rules
on land demarcation are unusual.
Demarcation
rules in the long run have to be applied with flexibility.
Particular in lowland systems with small slopes scouring of
rivers and sedimentation of canals and command area make changes
over a longer period inevitable.
Rules on breaking of bunds
A
category of rules closely related to the rules on the boundary
of the spate area concerns the breaking of diversion structures.
These rules are usually in place in areas where the entire
riverbed is blocked by earthen bunds. In some spate river
the construction of earthen bunds is not allowed under customary
rule (Kohler 2000), but in larger river beds with flat slopes
they are common.
Where
earthen bunds are used, they are generally made in such a
way that they break in case of high floods. This works as
a safety valve (see also section 3). It avoids substantial
damage to the channel network, as very large floods are passed
down the river rather than playing havoc with the flood channels.
In
several systems there are also rules on purposely breaking
bunds - once the designated area served by an upstream bund
is irrigated (see above) or once a certain part of the flood
season has lapsed. An example is the rules on breaking of
the gandas (earthen bunds) in the Nari River in Kacchi, Pakistan
- formalized in 1917. The rules are still observed, although
there is considerable tension on the actual breaking of the
bunds.
A
fairly typical example of such a dispute is the Chacar Bund
on the Chakar River in Balochistan. In the past this earthen
bund - spanning a width of some 50 meter - used to be constructed
with the help of bullocks and tractors. It collapsed every
year, as the water seeping through its base undermined the
structure. However, in 1990 the land owners of Chacar were
given a generous allocation of bulldozer time by the government.
They utilized this by making a very strong bund. The bund
did not fail that year. It irrigated all demarcated land of
Chacar and then the Chacar land owners allowed the water to
escape through a breach in their flood channel to an area
that was not entitled to flood water. The same pattern repeated
itself in the subsequent year. The Chacar land owners were
not keen on breaking their bund, as they wanted to spare themselves
the effort of rebuilding it. This led to fierce protest from
downstream land owners, who moved the head of the district
administration. They argued that he should break the hated
Chacar bund. His verdict was however only a very partly success
for the complainants. He reasoned he could not break the bund
since there was no earlier agreement on the breaking of the
bunds in the Chakar River. He maintained the demarcation rules on the
other hand. He order the Chakar farmers to repair the breach
in the flood channel and avoid that water went to unauthorized
Rules on Nari System, prepared in
1917 on revision of the old rules
From 10 May to 15 August the land
owners of the upper Nari are allowed to make gandas (earthen
bunds) in the Nari River. After 15 August they are not allowed.
When the land served by one ganda
in Upper Nari is fully irrigated, the landowners in that
ganda would allow land owners of the next ganda to break
it
After 15 August the land owners
of lower Nari are allowed to make gandas in the Nari River.
Land owners in upper Nari are not allowed to irrigate their
land in this period or let the water to go waste.
Water is not allowed to go waste
to the low lying areas east and west of the Nari River.
Guide bunds will prevent water flowing to these areas -
all landowners will contribute towards these bunds with
farmer in lower Nari paying twice the amount per hectare
in case bunds on the upper Nari were broken
If any dispute arises judges appointed
by Kalat State would inspect the area and would be authorized to
decide and allow a downstream party to break the ganda at
a proper time or instruct repair to a guide bund to take
effect within 5-10 days. In case repairs to guide bunds
are not made the main bund of the area concerned may be
broken.
In case a landowner refuses to contribute
gham (the contribution for maintenance) his land may be
confiscated
Rules on flow division
This
third category of rules arranges the distribution of water
between the different flood channels. Where an area is served
by several flood channels, there may be an agreement on the
proportion of flood water going into the different channels.
In practice, this is usually done by rather crude devices,
by having the head sections of flood channels at different
width and by placing obstructions in front of some of the
channels. Flow division may also be practised along a flood
channel with the width of the field intakes determining the
proportion of flow that each field receives.
Ethiopia - typical flow division between two tertiary channels
Whereas
the flow divisions are usually fixed, the traditional main
division in Wadi Labah in Eritrea is an example of a flow
division structure that is adjusted by moving brushwood around.
During the spate the water masters of the main five flood
channels stand on top of the structure and adjust it to ensure
that the flows to each area are fair. (Heile, pers. comm.)
Insert picture from Eritrea
Rules on sequence
A
fourth category of rules - which again may or may not be in
force - is the pre-arranged sequence in which fields are irrigated.
Where it applies, the route that water follows within the
area entitled to irrigation is described in detail: which
branch channel will receive water first and the priorities
of the different fields within the branch channels, with irrigation
generally moving down from head to tail of the channel (Serjeant
1964, Maktari 1971). Sequence rules are called 'numberwar'
or 'saroba paina' (Pakistan) or 'rada'ah' (Yemen). The sequence
usually adjusts to the level of the floods. If the flood is
low, the water will only flow in one or two of the priority
branch channels and the numberwar will apply to those channels
only. But, if the flood brings large quantities of water,
it will find its way through a large number of channels simultaneously.
Moreover, during high floods the force of water is larger
and instead of being obstructed and regulated, it will flow
in a large number of fields at the same time.
Rules on depth of irrigation
All
the four rule impose a certain predictability and equity.
The definition of the command areas, rules on breaking diversion
bunds and the limitations on the width of field intakes prevent
the water from being monopolized in the head reaches of the
flood irrigation system. The numberwar identifies priority
areas. Equity issues are also outspoken in the fifth type
of water distribution rule, which concerns the depth of irrigation,
expressed in agreements on the height of the field bunds.
These field bunds are usually made from the sediment deposited
within the flood fields and help maintaining the fields at
reasonable level. The height of the bunds determines the amount
of flood water that can be stored in the fields.
Rules
on the height of the bund and hence irrigation depth are not
common in spate areas in Pakistan. Instead they seem to be
standard practices in Yemen. The prevalence of irrigation depth rules in
Yemen is probably related to the practice of field to field irrigation.
In this practice one farmer takes his turn, as soon as his
neighbour completes the inundation of his land. He does so
by cutting the bund surrounding the field of the upstream
land owner. In this system competition between neighbours
can be fierce and to mitigate this, rules on water depth may
have evolved. In contrast, when each field is fed by its own
separate intake, as is usual in the spate irrigation systems
in other areas, such conflicts are rare and rules on the depth
of inundation are unusual. The amount of water applied depends
on the height of the field bund, but in most systems there
is no limitation in this respect. Field bunds are seen as
a way of disposing of the excess silt that accumulates with
the flood water and can reach any height.
In
general it appears that the smaller a single field the lower
the field bund. In this respect there is a large variation
between spate systems with regard to the sizes of fields.
On the one hand there are small parcelled fields in spate
systems such as Yandafero in Konso, Ethiopia. On the other hand there are fields of 1-2 ha
in size with field bunds reaching more than a meter, as in
Yemen. A main factor
explaining this variation is the frequency and size of the
floods, as well as the slope of the command area. The Yandefero
system is marked by a large number of mild floods, allowing
a distribution of water not very different from a perennial
system. In other systems instead floods can be high and episodical.
To control such quantities of water requires large fields
and high bunds.
Ethiopia - unusually low field bunds related to large number of
mild floodings
Rules on second turns
A
final category of rules is the right to a second water turn.
Several crops, though they may survive on one water application,
give significantly higher returns when they are irrigated
more than once. Sorghum, wheat and cotton are examples. Sorghum
in fact is often grown as a ratoon crop to catch an off-season
flood. For other crops, like pulses, one watering is sufficient.
In
many systems, floods come and go and a season may bring a
series of spates. This poses a dilemma: is the water that
comes with a second flood to be applied on the land that is
already under cultivation? Or is priority given to those cultivators
whose lands are still dry? Both variations exist, either the
option of upstream land owners to take a second turn, or the
obligation to restart irrigation from the place where it stopped
the previous time, and irrigate all downstream land before
upstream owners can use the water again. Where restrictions
are imposed on upstream owners, they usually apply in the
planting season. There are exceptional cases though such as
the Jama Bund in Kharan, Balochistan (BMIADP 1994) or Wadi
Labah in Eritrea (Heile, pers. comm.), where irrigation in
the next season starts where it stopped the previous season.
Water distribution rules and maintenance
There
is a very strong link between the rules on distributing spate
water and the organization of maintenance. In many systems
the right to irrigation by spate flows is tantamount to one's
contribution to repairs to the headworks or flood channels.
If one abstains from public duty one is simply not allowed
to open one's the intake to one's field. (Particularly if
the network of fields is supplied by individual intakes).
This link between water distribution rules and maintenance
has two more implications.
First,
as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter water distribution
rules will often serve to reduce uncertainty and thus avoid
conflict and create a more or less coherent group of land
owners, dependent on the spate system. In particular, the
demarcation of the irrigated perimeter is important as this
defines who has an entitlement to the flood water. Without
it, it is difficult to form a group of partners, making the
organization of the recurrent repair work problematic, not
to mention the formulation of rules on cost sharing and water
distribution.
Second,
apart from coherence critical mass is important in undertaking
repairs. The more so when repair is dependent on labour from
human beings and draught animals (as in most systems in the
past), a large force is required to rebuild structures and
make repairs. Excluding fellow land users can jeopardize
the sustainability of the system.
The
different water distribution rules can then be interpreted
as having an effect on the organization for maintenance: some
rules will help create a strong core group that will take
the lead, whereas other rules will expand the number of land
users that will share in the water and shoulder the burden
of the maintenance. Examples of rules that create a privileged
core group are the numberwar rule and the convention whereby
upstream farmers can avail of a second water turn, before
all downstream land is served. Mitigating rules, working towards
homogeneity in interests among a large number of land users,
are the demarcation of command area and restrictions on depth
of irrigation and second water turns[1].
The scale of the flood irrigation system is an important factor
in imposing mitigating or exacerbating rules. Mitigating rules,
that work to increase homogeneity between upstream and downstream
users, appear more feasible in small systems than in large
systems. However, as a system becomes larger and more complex,
it is increasingly impractical to enforce restrictions on
upstream land owners, because the cost of policing such agreement
goes up and the natural solidarity of the small group is lost.
As a result, mitigating rules are less common in large flood
irrigation systems. Instead in for instance the larger spate
systems of the Kacchi Plains of Balochistan or the now disused
spate systems in Saudi Arabia (Wildenhahn 1985) different villages
have a different maintenance levies - with areas in less privileged
places contributing proportionally less to the collective
effort.
5.3 Enforcement and
codification
"This system is at the
momebt being governed by the 'Kulyat and Riwajat Abpash' meticously
worked out by the British more than a century back. This document
has been and still is the Holy Book of spate irrigation. And
like true believers, we are treating it, in word and spirit
like the Holy Book. We consider it Divine, we consider it
Sacred, but we do not believe in it and we do not follow it.."
(Major Aminullah
Khan Gandapur, farmer, 1990, pg 122)
The
extent to which spate irrigation rights are codified varies.
The most elaborate codification concerns spate systems in
Yemen. In several system rules on the distribution of water and the
maintenance of the works date back 600 years. Enforcement
of these rules for a long time used to be the responsibility
of local sheikhs. With the investment in Yemen and the collectivisation of agriculture in Aden government
employees and staff of agricultural cooperatives took over.
When their role declined, they left a worrying vacuum (Al-Eryani
and Haddas 1998).
Similarly
rules on spate rights in the larger systems in the Suleiman
range in Pakistan (D.I. Khan and D.G. Khan) have been documented
in a register, formulated during the British period, the Kulyat
Rodwar or Kulyat and Riwayat Abpashi'. The register contains
a list of all villages responsible for the labour on each
bund. A special Collector was in charge to organize these
activities. This special functionary was responsible for the
enforcement of these rules, exhorting farmers to plug gullies
and encouraging them to rebuild their bunds. In the other
main spate irrigated area of Balochistan, the long and extensive
Nari system in the Kacchi Plains detailed rules have been
written down concerning the breaking of the different bunds
in the spate river (see box). These rules were enforced by
the 'teshildar ghandahat', an official put in place by the
then ruler of the area, the Khan of Kalat, whose land was
located at the tail end of the system. After Kalat State
joined Pakistan in 1948 this functionary become an employee
of the new government. Similarly the water rights on the Porali River,
like the Nari an almost semi-perennial river were defined.
What
is striking that in all these examples the authority with
which the rules are enforced has declined. Striking - as one
could also expect the opposite, as water becomes more scarce.
There are a variety of reasons:
- decline
of both traditional and modern government as rule enforcing
mechanism
- decline
in spate systems, with increased use of ground water in
the spate command areas
- confusion
of responsibilities on management after public investment
in the system
- change
of opportunities with the introduction of mechanized power.
6.4 Changing water
distribution rules
In
the past development decades several countries have undertaken
programs in support of spate irrigation (see chapter 1).
In Yemen,
Pakistan Tunisia and recently in Eritrea
investments are made in civil works, replacing traditional
structures. In Pakistan moreover provincial government have
supported spate irrigation systems by making bulldozers available
at below market rates. It has often been these external interventions
- by government or well-resourced non government organizations
- that have altered a fragile equation that existed under
customary rules.
In
improving spate irrigation systems - whether with engineering
works or through the use of mechanized traction - water distribution
rules change. The most common changes are:
- better
upstream control
- integration
of previous independent systems .
- change
from free flow to controlled flow
Almost
by definition external improvements to spate irrigation systems
result in better upstream control - that is provided they
work (chapter 3). Often this has disturbed delicate balances
that existed between upstream and downstream diversions. It
is not uncommon to see that the new structures create a new
water management situation - which over time changes the de
facto water distribution rules, in spite of agreements that
existed earlier and in spite of rules agreed at the time of
construction of the new structures. The change in water distribution
in Wadi Rima in Yemen
after the construction of the head works illustrates this.
The common headworks allowed better upstream control of the
spate flows - over time reducing the volumes of water passed
on to the tail area. The tail area that in the past was served
by an independent intake (Al-Eryani and Al-Amrani 1998).
Another
example is the Rehanzai Bund (box). The Rehanzai Bund also
shows that it is hard to make enforceable agreements in the
absence of a pervasive authority and in a situation with considerable
differences in power. Added to this is another impact of replacing
temporary headworks with engineered permanent ones. Permanent
structures change the relations between upstream and downstream
farmers, because upstream land owners become less dependent
on the contribution of tail end land owners. This may make
them less amenable to concessions in the distribution of flood
water.
The
Rehanzai Bund
The massive earthen Rehanzai Bund was
constructed at the confluence of the Bolan Rover and an
off-shoot of the Nari River on the Kacchi Plains of Balochistan.
The construction of the bund allowed the control of spate
flows in the Bagh area, where previously the spate water
had flown too fast to capture. After the Rehanzai Bund
was completed a number of well-placed landlords constructed
a series of permanent diversion bunds, immediately downstream
of the new bund. This obstructed the water rights of the
tail-end Choor-Nasirabad area. The district administration
supported the case of the down stream farmers and instructed
them to break the bund after their area had been served.
The landlords with considerable clout refused to do so.
As time passed more and more people had to leave the Choor
Nasirabad area for lack of farm income. The remaining group
was too weak to push its case and the upstream land lords
won the day.
Kohler
(2000) describes that the changes in spate diversion, following
the construction of civil works, may even go further. Two
permanent spate diversion dams were built in south Yemen in
the seventies on the at that time transboundary Wadi Harib.
As a reuslt the tail end farmers did no longer receive any
flood flows with the excpetion of years with unusually large
floods. They turned to groundwater development. Yet as the
recharge of groundwater was also cut off in this area, water
tables fell dramatically.
Another
change sometimes brought about by engineering interventions
is the integration of previously independent systems. A variation
of this is when a system with a free intake is replaced with
a common controlled diversion. Such changes bring persons
and even entire communities together in one system, that in
past may have had little affinity with one another. Sometimes
the reason to integrate different systems is to obtain the
economies of scale that justifies the investment in controlling
the spate flow in a river at one point with a relatively huge
investment in civil works. There is a world in reverse here,
as the down side of 'the economies of scale' is that it forces
groups of people that had little interaction earlier to work
together and distribute scarce water. In some cases this
has led to intractable social problems. In other cases it
has prevented integrated systems even from coming about.